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INFORMED CONSENT FOR THE MAN ON
THE CLAPHAM OMNIBUS: AN ENGLISH
CURE FOR "THE AMERICAN
DISEASE"?
FRANCES

H.

MILLER

*

The English I often express distaste for American-style medical
malpractice litigation. It has been referred to as "the American dis
ease,"2 and the English judiciary sometimes prides itself on resistance
to the plague. 3 Although precise comparative statistics are difficult to
obtain, approximately ten times as many claims for medical malprac
tice are filed against American physicians as are filed against their
counterparts in England. 4 Differences in legal rules, among many
other factors, explain why the English medical malpractice litigation
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, and Professor of Public
Health, Boston University School of Medicine; A.B., Mount Holyoke College, 1960; J.D.,
Boston University School of Law, 1965. Research for this article was supported in part by
a fellowship from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation. Professor Ian Kennedy, King's College,
London, made valuable comments on an earlier draft.
I. This article deals primarily with the law of England and Wales; the use of the term
England hereafter includes Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland, the rest of the United
Kingdom, have their own separate legal systems.
2. C. HAWKINS, MISHAP OR MALPRACTICE? 245 (1985); Barnett, "Medical Mal
practice: The American Disease. Is It Infectious?" Address by the Secretary of the Medi
cal Defence Union to the Royal Society of Medicine (Feb. 14, 1980), reprinted in 48 J.
MED. LEGAL Soc. 63 (1980). See also Kennedy, The Patient on the Clapham Omnibus, 47
MOD. L. REV. 454, 465 (1984) (commenting on the real reasons why the Court of Appeal
failed to adopt the reasonable patient standard of disclosure in Sidaway v. Board of Gover
nors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984] 2 W.L.R. 778 (C.A.».
3. See, e.g., Lim Poh Choo v. Camden Health Auth., [1979] 1 Q.B. 196,217 (C.A.)
(Lord Denning, dissenting) ("[I]f these [medical malpractice awards] get too large, we are
in danger of injuring the body politic: just as medical malpractice cases have done in the
United States of America.").
4. In 1981 an estimated 800 writs for medical malpractice were issued in England
and Wales, which have a population approximately one-fifth that of the United States.
ACTION FOR THE VICTIMS OF MEDICAL ACCIDENTS, ANNUAL REPORT 1983-84, 3. Two
years later approximately 42,000 claims were made against U.S. physicians for medical
malpractice. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFES
SIONAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE 80's, Report I, 10
(1984).
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experience differs so markedly from that of the U.S. 5 Taken together,
they establish that there is little chance that the malady, such as it is,
will cross the Atlantic in full-blown infectious state. 6
One of these differences in legal rules-at least in part---concems
the doctrine of infonned consent, which for purposes of this article
means consent based on disclosure of the risks as well as the benefits of
proposed medical intervention. 7 In contrast to the United States,
where each jurisdiction can adopt its own common law or statutory
standards for securing an infonned consent, 8 the English House of
Lords has just laid down a relatively conservative rule that binds the
entire country.9 In the first-impression case of Sidaway v. Board of
5. See Miller, Medical Malpractice: Do the English Have a Better Remedy?, 12 AM.
J.L. & MED., 433 (1986).
6. See generally Grubb, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Law in England: "Crisis?
What Crisis?," I J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 75 (1985); Lejeune, Malpractice
Mania: Not Britain's Cup of Tea, PRIVATE PRAC., Feb. 1986, at 12.
7. See generally Meisel, The Exceptions to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a
Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WISC. L. REV. 413
(discussion of informed consent).
8. Approximately one quarter of the states have adopted a prudent patient standard
of disclosure. T. BEAUCHAMP & L. MCCULLOUGH, MEDICAL ETHICS: THE MORAL RE
SPONSIBILITIES OF PHYSICIANS (1980). See also D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 11 22.1522.65 (1985).
9. On the binding effect of House of Lords decisions, see, 22 HALSBURY'S LAWS 798
99 § 1686 (3d ed. 1958). English appeals court decisions do not come neatly labeled in
terms of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. For example, it is not unusual for
each of the five Law Lords who ordinarily make up the bench on appeals to the House of
Lords to issue his own opinion, which is referred to as a speech. (There are fifteen Law
Lords altogether and a quorum consists of three judges. Five Law Lords, often chosen for
their experience with the issues under review, usually hear each appeal.) This may differ
ever so slightly-or sometimes more radically-from those of his Peers. Since opinions are
issued in order of seniority, the first Law Lord to speak may in fact turn out to be a dis
senter. Only after reading all the speeches can the holding be determined, and the precise
rule of law emerging from the case may prove elusive since each judge usually gives his own
shade of meaning to the rationale even when all reach the same result. See generally, A.
PETTERSON, THE LAW LORDS (1982). See Bradney, The Changing Face of the House of
Lords, JURID. REV., Dec. 1985, at 178 (analysis of the influence of individual judges be
tween 1974-84).
Decisions from the Court of Appeal, the intermediate appellate tribunal wherein cases
are usually heard by panels composed of three Lords Justice, take the same form. (There
are seventeen Court of Appeal justices, plus the Chief Judge and the Master of the Rolls.)
See generally P. W. D. RODMOND, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH LAW 34 (1981).
Since the composition of judicial panels on appeal varies, it can sometimes be difficult to
make an educated prediction about what will happen to a case when it goes up. As a result,
barristers are keenly attuned to the make-up of the bench in individual appeals. According
to Sidney Templeman, Q.c., now, ironically, a Law Lord, "I think the whole of our profes
sion [barristers] is really concerned with judge management. Most of the cases are terribly
difficult and very nicely poised and they nearly all turn on about ten minutes of the argu
ment." Id. at 232 n.l14. There was little uncertainty, however, about the result to be
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Governors ofBethlem Royal Hospital, \0 the Lords through a variety of
rationales adopted a physician-oriented rather than a patient-centered
standard of disclosure. In essence, the majority decreed that a physi
cian's duty to warn is measured by what other doctors tell their other
patients. The "man on the Clapham omnibus," as the English reason
able man is called, II is not entitled to be told anything that his doctor
chooses not to disclose, so long as a responsible body of medical pro
fessionals would sanction the choice to withhold information and the
jUdiciary does not find it impossible to support that choice. 12
English judicial deference to medical paternalism has its roots in
a system of government-provided medical care quite different from
that generally operating in the United States. 13 It is also heavily influ
enced by cultural norms l4 and financial constraints l5 unlike those to
be found in this country. Moreover, since English juries no longer
decide personal injury cases,16 the man who steps off the Clapham
omnibus has no opportunity to take a seat on the jury and have his say
about such issues as medical negligence and appropriate damages. In
expected from the House of Lords in a case like Sidaway. See Robertson, Informed Con
sent to Medical Treatment, 97 LAW Q. REv. 102, 125-26 (1981).
10. [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480. Apparently only two other English decisions had even
discussed the doctrine of informed consent in terms of an obligation to disclose risks prior
to Sidaway. See Chatterton v. Gerson, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 1003; Hills v. Potter, [1984] 1
W.L.R. 641. For an interesting analysis of the House of Lords' decision in Sidaway, see
Tetr, Consent to Medical Procedures: Paternalism, Self-Determination or Therapeutic Alli
ance?, 101 LAW Q. REV. 432 (1985).
11. Bolam v. Friem Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, 586-88.
12. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 491. Physicians, who along with their judicial
brethren presumably rarely ride the Clapham omnibus, are held to a higher standard of
care than the ordinary man. See Bolam, [1957] I W.L.R. 582.
13. For a general description of the functions of the National Health Service, see J.
GOODMAN, NATIONAL HEALTH CARE IN GREAT BRITAIN: LESSONS FOR THE U.S.A.
(1980). See also Stevens, The Evolution ofthe Health-Care Systems in the United States and
the United Kingdom: Similarities and Differences, in FOGARTY INTERNATIONAL CENTER
PROCEEDINGS, No. 40, at 13 (1977).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 92-106.
15. Great Britain limits total National Health Service (NHS) expenditures through
strictly controlled prospective budgeting. Health resource allocation within the NHS is
therefore a zero sum gain in which spending in one area necessarily reduces funds available
for use elsewhere. See Miller & Miller, The Painful Prescription: A Procrustean Perspec
tive?, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1383 (1986). The Court of Appeal in R. v. Sec'yof State for
Social Services, ex p. Hincks [1979] 123 Sol. J. 436, held that patients on waiting lists for
orthopedic surgery had no cause of action against the NHS for failing to make necessary
health care facilities available. The court held that budgetary limits must be read into the
statutory duty to run the NHS.
16. The right to trial by jury in civil cases, unless required by statute, was abolished
in Ward v. James, [1966] I Q.B. 273 (CA.). On the historical development of jury trials in
England, see P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY (1956).
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a society where class distinctions continue to be officially recognized,17
solicitude for a sister profession carries subliminal weight when judges
find the facts, apply the law, and award the damages as they do in
medical malpractice actions.
This article briefly analyzes English law regarding informed con
sent, culminating in the Sidaway opinion. IS It then examines the cul
tural and financial reasons which contribute to a different societal
attitude toward the medical profession in England than that which
generally prevails in the United States. Finally, it discusses whether
the model of shared medical decisionmaking set forth in Professor Jay
Katz's The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient 19 can be applied to the
English situation.
I.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT LAW IN ENGLAND

Pre-Sidaway Case Law

For purposes of this article the term "informed consent" refers to
a patient's acquiescence in medical treatment based on at least some
disclosure of the risks inherent in the proposed course of action. It
entails a duty to disclose which goes beyond a mere description of the
"general nature and purpose" of the doctor's recommendation, but
does not necessarily encompass a reasonable patient standard of dis
closure. 20 English case law long has recognized a cause of action for
trespass to the person if medical procedures are performed with no
consent at alpl It also has recognized the possibility of an action for
negligence if the patient is not told the general nature and purpose of a
proposed medical intervention in advance. 22 Only recently, however,
have English courts begun to indicate that physicians have an explicit
17. For example, social class is categorized by occupation rather than by income in
Great Britain. See, e.g., Dead Reckoning, Dead Wrong, THE EcONOMIST, Aug. 9, 1986, at
39. C/, A Middling Sort of Country, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. II, 1986, at 52.
18. For pre-Sidaway discussions of the law relating to informed consent, see, e.g.,
Robertson, supra note 9; Samuels, What the Doctor Must Tell the Patient, 22 MED. SCI. L.
41 (1982); Skegg, Informed Consent to Medical Procedures, 15 MED. SCI. L. 124 (1975);
Skegg, A Justification for Medical Procedures Performed Without Consent, 90 LAW Q. REV.
512 (1974).
19. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
20. Some English judges use the term informed consent to apply only to the reason
able patient standard of disclosure. See Lord Justice Dunn's Court of Appeal opinion in
Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984]2 W.L.R. 778, 795 (C.A.);
see infra text accompanying notes 48-49.
21. Hamilton v. Birmingham R.H.B., [1969] 2 Brit. Med. J. 456; Cull v. Butler,
[1932] I Brit. Med. J. 1195.
22. Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] I W.L.R. 582.
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duty to disclose the inherent risks associated with their
recommendations.
The 1980 case of Chatterton v. Gerson 23 seems to be the first
reported opinion to hold that a doctor "ought to warn of what may
happen by misfortune, however well the operation is done, if there is a
real risk of misfortune inherent in the procedure."24 This duty to
warn was derived from the physician's general duty of care, however,
rather than from the patient's right to receive information. 25 The
court found that the physician's duty stemmed from his professional
obligation to exercise the care of a responsible doctor in similar cir
cumstances, as set forth in the landmark case of Bolam v. Friern Hos
pital Management Committee. 26 Thus the Chatterton court saw what
other doctors think necessary for their patients to know as the mea
sure of a defendant-doctor's duty to disclose. The court defined a
"real" risk to mean one the medical profession judged important
enough to warrant raising with patients, rather than one patients on
their own would consider significant.
The post-Chatterton case of Hills v. Potter 27 seems to be the only
other opinion concerning a physician's duty to disclose risks reported
prior to the House of Lords decision in Sidaway, except for the Court
of Appeal opinion in Sidaway itself.28 The plaintiff in Hills was para
lyzed following an operation to correct a neck deformity and asserted
that the defendant had never told her that she might be worse off fol
lowing the operation. All three neurosurgeons testifying as expert wit
nesses stated that they would have informed a patient of no more than
the plaintiff testified the defendant told her, and the trial court found
that no warning concerning possible paralysis was given at all. 29 The
23. [1980] 3 W.L.R. 1003.
24. Id. at 1014.
25. England does not have a written constitution specifically protecting the rights of
the individual, and the common law has tended to focus more on developing the concept of
duties owed to others by members of society than on the rights of societal members per se.
See generally H. CALVERT, AN INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1985).
26. [1957] I W.L.R. 582.
27. [1984] I W.L.R. 641.
28. Freeman v. Home Office, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 802 (C.A.). Freeman was decided by
the Court of Appeal just after its decision in Sidaway. The case concerned the administra
tion of behavior modification drugs to a prisoner allegedly without consent. Although
Lord Justice Brown stated: "[In light of Sidaway] it is not open to ... [the plaintiff] to
argue that 'informed consent' is a consideration which can be entertained by the courts of
this country," id. at 811, the case did not concern the doctrine in the context of ordinary
medical treatment.
29. Hills, [1984] I W.L.R. at 643.
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court specifically rejected the "North American doctrine of informed
consent," by which it meant the "prudent patient" test, and held that
the professional standard of practice applies to a doctor's duty to dis
close in the same manner that it applies to duties with respect to diag
nosis and treatment. 30 In other words, physicians need only tell their
patients what other doctors think is enough for patients to know. Jus
tice Hirst found himself unable to distinguish between medical advice,
on the one hand, and medical diagnosis and treatment on the other,
with respect to the standard of care demanded from the profession. 31
In any event, as a trial court judge he considered himself bound by the
reasonable physician precedent established by Bolam. Bolam had in
cluded a claim for negligent failure to warn about the dangers of elec
troshock therapy, but the Queen's Bench held that a doctor's duty
does not necessarily entail warning of the risks of proposed treatment.
Only if other doctors would warn their patients under similar circum
stances would the defendant be required to do so.
B.

The Sidaway Decision

The facts of the Sidaway case, as found by the trial court, were
quite simple. The plaintiff had suffered persistent neck and shoulder
pain stemming from a work-related 'accident in 1958, when she was
fifty-eight years old. The defendant surgeon, Mr. Falconer,32 per
formed a spinal disc operation on her in 1960, which ultimately re
lieved her discomfort for several years. In 1973, Mr. Falconer wrote
to the patient inquiring how she was, and the plaintiff informed him
that the original pain had returned.
Mrs. Sidaway was admitted to the hospital for evaluation and a
myelogram revealed another disc problem. In Lord Scarman's words,
"Mr. Falconer diagnosed that pressure on a nerve root was the cause
of her pain and decided to operate."33 According to the trial court,
Mr. Falconer was a "reserved, slightly autocratic man 'of the old
school',"34 but since he died prior to trial there was no way to ascer
tain his version of what warnings were actually given to Mrs. Sidaway
30, See Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health Auth., [1984] 1 W.L.R. 634
(diagnosis); Whitehouse v. Jordan, [1981] I W.L.R. 246 (treatment).
31. Hills, [1984]1 W.L.R. at 652.
32. Surgeons are addressed as Mr. in England, whereas all other M.D.s are called
Dr.
33. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480,
484 (emphasis added).
34. Sidaway, High (trial) Court decision by Mr. Justice Skinner delivered on Febru
ary 19, 1982, reported in Schwartz & Grubb, Why Britain Can't Afford Informed Consent,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1985, at 19.
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before surgery.35 The plaintiff denied being informed of any risks, but
the trial court specifically found that on the balance of probabilities
"the day before the operation ... [the defendant] followed his usual
practice . . . and explained the nature of the operation in simple
terms.... As to the risks, ... [the judge was] satisfied that he did not
refer to the danger of cord damage or to the fact that this was an
operation of choice rather than necessity."36
Mrs. Sidaway's spinal cord was damaged during surgery, and she
became partially paralyzed as a result. She did not allege negligence in
Mr. Falconer's performance of the procedure, but claimed instead that
he failed to exercise due care with respect to the information he gave
her prior to the operation. 37 Expert testimony established that the
risk of spinal cord damage was in the range of one to two per cent. 38
It also established that a responsible body of medical opinion would
sanction telling the plaintiff nothing more than what the trial court
found the defendant probably had told Mrs. Sidaway.39 The issue on
appeal was thus squarely whether professional custom should deter
mine the standard of disclosure for consent to medical procedures, or
wheth'er the American "prudent patient" test should be adopted
instead.
Three opinions were delivered in the Court of Appeal decision of
Sidaway,40 all finding for the defendant. Sir John Donaldson, the
Master of the Rolls,41 delivered the first opinion, specifically rejecting
what he referred to as the "American" test for the standard of disclo
sure. He said, "No doubt ... [the prudent patient test] is valid if the
doctor happens to be treating that happy abstraction, the 'prudent pa
tient,' but I suspect that he is a fairly rare bird and I have no doubt
35. The plaintiff had signed a routine consent form stating that the nature and pur
pose of the operation had been explained to her by one Dr. Goudzari, who testified that he
had provided such general information, but that he left warning of the risks to the defend
ant. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 486.
36. Id. at 486 (quoting from transcript of the High Court proceedings).
37. Id. at 485-86.
38. Id. at 485.
39. Id. at 486.
40. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984] 2 W.L.R. 778
(C.A.). For a trenchant critique of the Court ofAppeal decision, see Kennedy, supra note
2. See also Annas, Why the British Courts Rejected the American Doctrine of Informed
Consent, 74 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1286 (1984); Grubb, Medical Law-Doctors' Advice and
the Reasonable Man: Do We Need a Second Opinion?, 43 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 240 (1984);
Hodgkinson, Medical Treatment: Informing Patients of Material Risks, 1984 PUB. L. 414;
Jones, Doctor Knows Best?, 100 LAW Q. REV. 355 (1984).
41. The Master of the Rolls is the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal, directly
below the House of Lords. On the organization of the British judiciary generally, see P. W.
D. RODMOND, supra note 9.
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that his removal to the courts from his natural habitat, which would, I
assume, be a seat or hand rail on the Clapham omnibus, would do
nothing for patients or medicine, although it might do a great deal for
lawyers and litigation."42
The Master of the Rolls chose amusing language to make his
point, and it conveys many messages, not all of them intended. First
and foremost, it implies that medical malpractice litigation is in some
way unmeritorious, and that the bar cannot be trusted to act respon
sibly in this area. Second, it acknowledges that patients present in
highly individualized situations, a factor which one might think would
militate in favor of allowing patients to make their own medical deci
sions. Third, the words convey a surprisingly condescending attitude
toward the time-honored reasonable man, who cannot be counted
upon to act prudently when it comes to making decisions about his
own health.
This is the same man on the Clapham omnibus, however, whose
conduct in other areas sets the standard by which almost everyone
else's behavior is measured. 43 The medical profession has always been
held to a higher standard of care with respect to diagnosis and treat
ment than the man on the Clapham omnibus would be, because doc
tors presumably possess more sophisticated skills than does the
ordinary public traveler. Our bus rider is emasculated in deference to
medical paternalism, however, when it comes to deciding whether to
accept his doctor's recommendations. If he is entitled to be informed
only about what the medical profession chooses to tell him, is it not
ironic for the law to make him take sole responsibility for the conse
quences when he merely follows his doctor's advice?
Although the Master of the Rolls opted for a professional stan
dard of disclosure, he did acknowledge that "the law will not permit
the medical profession to play God."44 By that he meant that the
jUdiciary retains the option to second-guess customary physician be
havior when it is "manifestly wrong" in some abstract sense, appar
ently easily discernible by judges. 4s Thus in the Master of the Rolls'
hierarchy of medical decisionmaking, patients are relatively powerless,
42. Sidaway, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 791.
43. Bolam v. Friem Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, 586-88.
44. Sidaway, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 791.
45. Id. The transatlantic case of Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981
(1974), wherein the Supreme Court of Washington told ophthalmologists what test must be
performed to protect patients under the age of forty from glaucoma, would thus presump
tively meet with the Master of the Rolls' approval.
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doctors control the information flow, and English judges reserve for
themselves the prerogatives of the deity.
Lord Justice Dunn's Court of Appeal opinion in Sidaway minced
no words in holding that "[t]he doctrine of informed consent forms no
part of English law."46 Lord Justice Dunn reached that conclusion
"with no regret"47 for two reasons. In essence, he indulged in
counterintuitive logic by saying that the relationship of confidence and
trust between doctor and patient would be damaged if doctors were
required to disclose material risks. Since in his view most patients
"prefer to put themselves unreservedly in the hands of their doc
tors,"48 presumably they would be frightened if they really under
stood what their doctors were doing. Moreover, he worried about the
impact of a patient-centered standard of disclosure on the practice of
defensive medicine. Patients would suffer, because instead of "concen
trat[ing] on their primary duty of treating their patients," doctors
"would inevitably be concerned to safeguard themselves."49 This
view is not exactly a vote of confidence for a profession which is sup
posed to have fiduciary responsibilities for the welfare of patients.
Lord Justice Brown-Wilkinson premised his Court of Appeal re
marks-which are generally considered to constitute the lead opin
ion-on the notion that patients have the right to decide whether to
go forward with therapy. 50 He too, however, felt that doctors should
be the arbiters of exactly which risks should be disclosed to their pa
tients. Too much disclosure might impair patient confidence in the
medical profession, which Lord Justice Brown-Wilkinson considered
an essential element in effecting "cures." In essence, he placed great
emphasis on the psychological aspect of physician-patient interac
tion-on what Professor Katz would term the "magical" qualities of
the therapeutic relationship-although he did give lip service to the
principle of patient autonomy.
46. Sidaway, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 795.
47. Id.
48. Id. Much of the available evidence, however, points precisely in the opposite
direction. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE NATIONAL HEALTH
SERVICE ch. 5 (1979); McClean, Learning about Death, 5 J. MED. ETHICS 67 (1979), both
confirming that patients in the United Kingdom want information from their doctors and
are resentful when they feel they are not being informed. See also REPORT OF THE
HEALTH SERVICE COMMISSIONER (1984-85), which confirms that the majority of com
plaints to the Health Service Ombudsman concern failures of one sort or another in com
munication between NHS caregivers and their patients.
49. Sidaway, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 795. According to one commentator, English phy
sicians would be unable to increase their practice of defensive medicine significantly be
cause of fiscal constraints on the NHS. Grubb, supra note 40, at 243.
50. Sidaway, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 796-97.
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The attitudes of individual judges are important to appreciate the
flavor of informed consent theory in England; although the trial judge
and all eight of the judges who heard Sidaway on its two stages of
appeal found for the defendant surgeon, their reasons for doing so va
ried widely. Lord Scarman, who gave the first speech in the House of
Lords, was the only one to embrace a standard of disclosure based on
patients' rightS. 51 Even he would have found for the defendant, how
ever, because there was no direct evidence concerning materiality of
the risk of spinal cord damage.
Lord Scarman reasoned:
If one considers the scope of the doctor's duty by beginning with the
right of the patient to make his own decision ... the right to be
informed of significant risks and the doctor's corresponding duty
are easy to understand: for the proper implementation of the right
requires that [a] ... doctor ... inform his patient of the material
risks inherent in the treatment. 52

He recognized situations in which the therapeutic privilege would jus
tify a doctor in withholding information from a depressed or highly
emotional patient, but came down squarely in favor of the prudent
patient test. 53 If one read only Lord Scarman's opinion, or made the
mistake of thinking that the first speech represented the rule of the
case, one would receive precisely the wrong impression about the stan
dard of disclosure for informed consent under English law.
Lord Diplock and the rest of the Law Lords firmly rejected the
transatlantic rule in favor of a physician-determined standard of dis
closure. 54 Paradoxically, Lord Diplock noted in an elitist aside that
the jUdiciary would not have to jostle with the common man for space
on the Clapham omnibus.
[W]hen it comes to warning about risks, the kind of training and
experience that a judge will have undergone at the Bar makes it
natural for him to say (correctly) it is my right to decide whether
any particular thing is done to my body, and I want to be fully
51. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1985] 2 W.L.R. 480,
496. Lord Scarman is well known for his endorsement of the principle of disclosure in
other contexts as well. See Scarman, The Right to Know, GRANADA GUILDHALL LEC
TURE (1984); Home Office v. Harman, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 338, 350; see also Lee, Principle
and Policy, 101 LAW Q. REV. 313, 315 (1985).
52. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 494.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 500. For other analyses of the House of Lords Sidaway opinion, see Lee,
Operating Under Informed Consent, 101 LAW Q. REV. 316 (1985); Schwartz & Grubb,
supra note 34; Teff, supra note 10; Williams, Pre-Operative Consent and Medical Negli
gence, 14 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 169 (1985).
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informed of any risks there may be involved of which I am not al
ready aware from my general knowledge as a highly educated man
of experience, so that I may form my own judgment as to whether to
refuse the advised treatment or not. 55

Thus, Lord Diplock asserted that judges are entitled to be in
formed about all material risks as a matter of course, whereas he spe
cifically denied that right to the common man. He acknowledged that
our bus rider would be entitled to equal treatment, however, if only he
had the wit to ask for it. According to Lord Diplock, if a patient spe
cifically questions his doctor about the risks of proposed treatment,
"[n]o doubt. . . the doctor would tell him whatever it was the patient
wanted to know ...."56 In other words, the standard of care de
manded from the medical profession is to answer fully and truthfully,
but only if a patient works up the nerve to ask the doctor to justify his
advice.
Lord Diplock again betrayed an attitude of superiority when it
comes to assessing the impact of disclosure, for he said, "The only
effect that mention of risks can have on the [ordinary] patient's mind
... can be in the direction of deterring ... treatment which in the
expert opinion of the doctor it is in the patient's [best] interest to un
dergo."57 In Diplock's view paternalism is justified for the fearful
rider of public transport, who cannot be expected to understand his
own best interests. It would never do for judges, however, who are not
willing to cede power to anyone else to determine what treatment is
best for them.
This, after all, is precisely the sticking point. Professor Katz re
minds us that Pascal once said, "the heart has its reasons which reason
knows nothing of" (p. 91). Lord Diplock understands that point per
fectly well when it comes to making his own treatment decisions, but
he is unwilling to grant the man on the Clapham omnibus the same
opportunity to weigh his personal value system against medical opin
ion. Perhaps he might do well to remember that bus riders as well as
judges may have personal priorities about which their physicians are
unaware. Moreover, they too may not value medical intervention per
se as highly as does the medical profession. In any event, Lord
Diplock's views seem considerably to the right of his brethren on the
bench.
Lord Bridge, joined by Lord Keith, agreed that when questioned
55. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 500 (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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by a patient a doctor must answer both truthfully and as fully as the
questioner requires. 58 In the absence of questioning, however, he saw
the extent of disclosure almost purely as a matter for clinical judg
ment. Like the Master of the Rolls, he would reserve the right for the
jUdiciary to overrule medical custom in situations where there was "a
substantial risk of grave adverse consequences,"59 but as a general
matter he considered it impractical to adopt a prudent patient stan
dard of disclosure. To him, "the realities of the doctor/patient rela
tionship" preclude true understanding of technical issues on the part
of the patient. 60 More importantly, however, they would lead to un
predictability in litigation because Lord Bridge viewed the prudent pa
tient standard as "so imprecise as to be almost meaningless."61 Bear
in mind that under the English court system judges, not juries, would
have to implement that allegedly elusive standard. Those same judges
seem to have little trouble using the conduct of the man on the
Clapham omnibus as the measuring rod for most other forms of negli
gent behavior.
In the final Sidaway opinion, Lord Templeman agreed with all of
his brethren that, in the face of a patient's questions, a doctor must
give honest answers.62 He then, however, said a curious thing in
agreeing with Lords Diplock, Keith and Bridge that a professional
standard of disclosure governed the case. He stated, "The relationship
between doctor and patient is contractual in origin, the doctor per
forming services in consideration for fees payable by the patient."63 He
thought an obligation to provide all information available to the doc
tor "would often be inconsistent with the doctor's contractual obliga
tion to have regard to the patient's best interest."64
Why did Lord Templeman analyze the issue in terms of fee-for
service medicine when the plaintiff-along with ninety-three percent
of the British population65-had received her medical care from the
NHS where virtually no fees are involved? Perhaps all he really meant
was that he sees the physician-patient relationship as contractual in
origin: whether a doctor actually agrees with individual patients to
58.
59.

60.
61.

62.
vain for
63.
64.

Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 503-04.
Id. at 504.
"[T]he patient cannot complain of lack of information unless the patient asks in
more information ...." Id. at 507.
Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
Id.
(U.K.) OFFICE OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, COMPENDIUM OF HEALTH STATISTICS

65.
§ 2, at 3 (1984).

.
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provide services for a price or simply undertakes to treat them as part
of his contractual relationship with the NHS, his duty of care should
be the same. Lord Templeman acknowledged the existence of some
general duty to disclose the dangers of proposed treatment but, along
with three of his brethren in the House of Lords, the trial judge, and
all of the judges at the Court of Appeal level, deferred to the medical
profession to determine which ones. 66 Presumably the jUdiciary still
retains an oversight function for those cases where the medical stan
dard of disclosure is too low for judges to countenance, but as a practi
cal matter physicians determine the requirements for disclosure.
C.

Post-Sidaway Case Law

Thus far only three reported cases have discussed the doctrine of
informed consent in any detail since the House of Lords rendered its
opinion in Sidaway, and all of them dealt with the issue of specific
questioning by patients. 67 In Lee v. South West Thames Regional
Health Authority,68 the infant plaintiff suffered brain damage while
receiving treatment either in the hospital or on the way to it in an
ambulance. His mother sought a copy of an internal memorandum
prepared for the defendant health authority concerning events which
occurred during the ambulance ride. 69 The Court of Appeal refused
to order discovery, on the ground that the memo was a privileged
communication between a third party and the defendant, prepared for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice,1°
The Master of the Rolls reached that conclusion "with undis
guised reluctance, because ... there is something seriously wrong with
the law if ... [the plaintiff's] mother cannot find out what exactly
caused ... [the] brain damage."7l He then went on to suggest an
unusual use of Sidaway's holding that a physician must answer a pa
66. Sidaway, [1985] 2 W.L.R. at 508·09.
67. Newman v. Hounslow & Spelthorne Health Auth., (Apr. 17, 1985) (LEX IS,
Enggen library, Cases file). The case was decided two months after the House of Lords
decision in Sidaway was rendered. Newman discussed informed consent in the context of
the Court of Appeal's Sidaway opinion. See also Thake & Another v. Maurice, [1986] 2
W.L.R. 337; Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Auth. & Another, [1985] 3
W.L.R. 830; Cornish v. Midland Bank pic, [1985] 3 All E.R. 513 (CA.); King v. King,
(LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (Oct. 30, 1985); Lloyd Cheyham & Co. v. Littlejohn &
Co., (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (Sept. 30, 1985). All of the above cases cite, but do
not discuss, the House of Lords Sidaway decision.
68. Sidaway v. Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984] 1 W.L.R. 845
(CA.).
69. Id. at 847.
70. Id. at 850.
71. Id.
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tient's questions about proposed treatment. He noted that if the medi
cal profession is required to answer questions before treatment, there
seemed to be no reason to distinguish its obligation when it came to
answering patient questions after treatment about what actually took
place. 72 He went on to suggest that the plaintiff might be able to
accomplish discovery through the circuitous route of a contract action
for breach of the duty to inform. 73
Although the Master of the Rolls demonstrated sensitivity to the
possible ramifications of the Sidaway decision, his well-meant advice is
probably faulty as far as actually compelling production of the docu
ment is concerned. A plaintiff-patient might indeed be able to recover
damages for breach of an implied contractual duty to inform. The
policies underlying the attorney-client privilege militate strongly
against specific performance of any contractual duty, however, insofar
as it would be applied to compel disclosure of memoranda generated
specifically for the purpose of potential litigation. Moreover, the duty
to answer questions raised prior to treatment set forth in Sidaway is
designed to protect the patient's right to decide whether to proceed
with proposed therapy. That issue is no longer relevant after treat
ment has been given, so any duty to answer questions after the fact
cannot be premised solely on Sidaway's policy of promoting condi
tional patient decisionmaking autonomy.
The next reported decision discussing the Sidaway holdings was
the trial court opinion in Blyth v. Bloomsbury Health Authority & An
other.74 The case involved a health visitor 7S whose doctor had pre
scribed Depo-provera as a contraceptive following childbirth. The
plaintiff had requested detailed information about the drug's side ef
fects and about available alternatives, but her doctor told her only that
there might be a little bleeding. 76 In fact, a rather broad range of
potential complications is associated with the drug.
The court applied Sidaway to give judgment for the plaintiff, find
ing that, "as she was someone with nursing qualifications who could be
trusted not to act irrationally because of what she was told, she was ...
entitled to be given such information as was available to the hospi
tal. "77 Note, however, the attitudes permeating the judge's choice of
72. Id.
73. Id. at 851.
74. (May 24, 1985) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
75. Health visitors are trained nurses employed by the NHS to provide community
based outpatient care.
76. Blyth, (LEX IS, Enggen library, Cases file).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
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words. The opinion implies that had the plaintiff not been a medical
professional herself, she would not have been entitled to what Sidaway
says is the right of every patient: to be given honest and truthful an
swers to specific questions about proposed treatment. Moreover, the
opinion implies that medical personnel need convey only the informa
tion they happen to have, not the information they reasonably should
know. Under Bolam, that is not a correct statement of a physician's
general duty of care in England. 78 Presumably a doctor must know
what other responsible physicians know in order to avoid liability for
negligence.
The latest opinion, Gold v. Haringey Health Authority,19 involved
an unsuccessful tubal ligation performed on the plaintiff-patient in
1979 to prevent pregnancy. The Queen's Bench took great pains to
point out that the informed consent aspect of the case involved alleged
negligence in a counselling context rather than the therapeutic milieu
of Sidaway, and seems to have limited the Sidaway rule to therapeutic
situations. The court found that the plaintiff had not been warned
about the failure rate for tubal ligation, nor had she been advised
about vasectomies or other forms of birth control and their relative
rates of success. 80
The court held that "in the context of someone seeking contra
ceptive advice there was no such body of medical opinion [in 1979]
which would have failed to mention that there was a risk of failure of
. . . post partum sterilization or that vasectomy was an option or to
make inquiries of the domestic situation of the party seeking advice."81
For that reason, therefore, the defendants' conduct was deemed negli
gent under the principles set forth in Bolam. 82
The Gold court went on, however, to consider whether Sidaway
would have compelled a defense finding if there had been a responsible
body of medical opinion in 1979 which would have acted as did the
defendants, in a counselling context. 83 Justice Schiemann explicitly
stated that he did not consider himself bound by the professional stan
78.
79.
80.

Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Man·agement Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582.
(June 16, 1986) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
Id.
S1. Id.
82. Id.
83. "It is not enough to show that there is a body of competent professional opinion
which considers that there was a wrong decision if there also exists a body of professional
opinion equally competent which supports the decision as reasonable in the circum
stances." Id. (quoting Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health Auth., [1984] I
W.L.R. 634, 638).
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dard of care. 84 He analyzed the case as one involving the general
solicitation of advice which simply happened to be medical, and found
the hospital physicians under a duty to warn about the possibility of
failure and to mention other contraceptive means. 85 Thus, Sidaway
was inapplicable and the defendants' conduct in failing to disclose was
negligent. 86
Whether one can so easily carve contraceptive counselling out
from under the umbrella of medical advice and thus avoid the harsh
ness of the Sidaway rule is by no means clear. The court might have
been on more solid ground analytically had it chosen to pursue
Sidaway's lead that when patients ask questions physicians must give
full and truthful answers. It could then have reached the same result
without trying to exclude contraceptive counselling from the medical
disclosure category. Surely when a patient asks medical personnel
about contraception, a full answer would include a discussion of alter
native means and their relative success rates. In any event, the Gold
opinion signals lower court resistance to an expansive interpretation of
Sidaway.

II.

CULTURAL AND FINANCIAL DIFFERENCES

The National Health Service (NHS) is a socialized health care
system which provides medical services essentially free of direct
charge to British residents. 87 NHS general practitioners ordinarily
practice medicine both physically and professionally removed from
hospital-based specialists, or consultants. General Practitioners (GPs)
deliver ninety per cent of NHS physician services, but they usually do
not have hospital privileges. If their patients are sick enough to re
quire specialist skills, GPs must route them to the appropriate consult
ant and relinquish their care. 88
GPs are thus the gatekeepers to more specialized-and therefore
more costly-medical services, which are not available in the same
quantity as they are in the United States because of strict budgetary
84. "Mr. Miller argued that ... I would be bound by Sidaway ... to discuss the
Plaintiff's case. I do not agree with him." Id.
85. Gold, (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
86. Id.
87. See supra note 26.
88. It is considered a breach of professional ethics under ordinary circumstances for
a specialist to see a patient unless he or she has been referred by a general practitioner.
GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE: FITNESS TO
PRACTICE, Part III (iii) (G) (\983).
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constraints. 89 GPs have internalized the fact that not every NHS pa
tient can have access to all the state-of-the-art medicine that might
conceivably provide benefit; their referrals and treatment recommen
dations necessarily are tempered by an understanding that patients
must be cared for within a system in which medical resources are
scarce. In fact, doctors are encouraged to take resource allocation ex
plicitly into account in patient treatment decisions. This obviously in
creases physician reluctance to volunteer the kind of complete
information about treatment alternatives advocated by Professor Katz
in The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient. The British Medical Asso
ciation's Handbook ofMedical Ethics delicately expresses the point as
follows: "Within the National Health Service resources are finite, and
this may restrict the freedom of the doctor to advise his patients, who
will usually be unaware of this limitation. This situation infringes
upon the ordinary relationship between patient and doctor...."90
British health economist Alan Williams is more direct. He has
warned that individual clinicians should not flinch from counting costs
as well as benefits when determining health service availability.
"Otherwise, if one person stands to benefit [by gaining access to medi
cal care where the expense is grossly disproportionate to any expected
benefit] then there is no limit to the sacrifices that others may properly
be called upon to bear as a consequence."91 As the former Chief
Medical Officer for the NHS put it, the system is designed to deliver
"the most for the most and not everything for a few. "92 Both of those
statements imply that the physician-not the patient-makes the
treatment choice by determining who will have access to health re
sources. According to at least one doctor, "[t]he key to turning down
the patient is not to get eyeball to eyeball with him because if you do
there is no way you can actually say no."93 In other words, the patient
who knows about treatment alternatives is likely to demand them, but
the system is not designed to accommodate patient choice-informed
or not.
The British population accepts such scarcity more readily than
89. H. AARON & w. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING Hos
PITAL CARE (1984). C/, Miller & Miller, supra note IS.
90. THE BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK OF MEDICAL ETHICS, ~
10.44 (1984) (emphasis added).
91. Williams, Medical Ethics: Health Service Efficiency and Clinical Freedom, NUF
FIELD!YORK PORTFOLIOS, Folio 2 (1984).
92. Godber, Striking the Balance: Therapy, Prevention and Social Support, 3 WORLD
HEALTH FORUM 285 (1982).
93. H. AARON & W. SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 107 (quoting an anonymous
physician).
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would its American counterpart for complex reasons, including the
fact that patients incur virtually no direct costs for NHS care. 94 They
also tend to stoicism about their health, in part because "Britain is an
original sin society in which illness and debility are seen as part of the
natural order of things...."95 The stiff upper lip as an attribute of
national character is not a myth, and aggressive pursuit of treatment
alternatives through an expansive use of informed consent doctrine
does not seem to fit comfortably with that image. The open dialogue
advocated in The Silent World of Doctor and Patient might thus be
more uncomfortable for English patients than it would be for most
Americans.
English physicians, on the other hand, tend to be more paternalis
96
tic -sometimes even more autocratic97 -than their U.S. analogues.
Several factors contribute to this situation. The English educational
system long has separated out promising students for special treatment
at early ages on the results of standardized examinations, and only
recently have those tests become more egalitarian. 98 Less than twenty
per cent of the English population completes university,99 where both
94. Great Britain funds the NHS from a central tax base, derived from general reve
nues and National Insurance contributions supplemented by nominal patient charges for
such items as prescription drugs and eyeglasses. At least one commentator has suggested
that malpractice litigation in the U.S. simply constitutes a way of compensating injured
patients for the lack of a well developed social welfare system and socialized medicine.
Robertson, supra note 9, at 109. Other commentators suggest that since patients cannot be
guaranteed access to all state-of-the-art therapy because of NHS resource constraints, Eng
lish courts have been reluctant to expand the doctrine of informed consent. Schwartz &
Grubb, supra note 34.
95. Klein, Rationing Health Care, 289 BRIT. MED. J. 143 (1985).
96. See, e.g., Brewin, Truth, Trust and Paternalism, 2 LANCET 490 (1985); Short,
Some Consequences 0/ Granting Patients Access to Consultants' Records, 1 LANCET 1316
(1986); Teff, supra note 10 at 443-45. But see Baum, Do We Need In/ormed Consent? 2
LANCET 911 (1986). On paternalism in medicine, see generally C. CHAPMAN, PHYSICIANS,
LAW AND ETHICS (1984); Matthews, Can Paternalism Be Modernized?, 12 J. MED. ETHICS
133 (1986). On the attitude and training of British consultants, see D. PENDLETON, THE
CONSULTATION (1984). On the point that British patients want more information than
their physicians usually see fit to give them, see INST. OF MED. ETHICS BULL., Supp. No.3,
Dec. 1986.
97. See, e.g., Cowen, In the Rear and Limping a Little: Some Reflections on
Medicine, Biotechnology and the Law: The Roscoe Pound Lectures, 64 NEB. L. REV. 548,
561 (1985) (describing a recent English neonate heart transplant wherein the cardiac sur
geon allegedly admitted that the unprecedented operation was an experiment, but justified
it by saying that all surgery advances by experiment). See also I. KENNEDY, THE UN
MASKING OF MEDICINE (1983).
98. On the new General Certificate of Secondary Education examination for 16 year
olds which replaced the old system of O-levels (for advanced track) and CSE tests (for less
bright students), see All Sheep, No Goats, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1986, at 53.
99. See generally WHITTAKER'S ALMANAC 1064 (\986).
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law and medicine are undergraduate subjects. Physicians (as well as
most lawyers from whose ranks judges are chosen) come from this
bright and privileged group. Having survived the rigid winnowing
process, English doctors are accustomed to ego reinforcement and
have been conditioned through special treatment to feel particularly
confident about their medical judgments. As a corollary, they can
seem condescending toward the ability of non-professionals to com
prehend medical issues, and their judicial brethren have been known
to share that attitude. loo
Moreover, the jUdiciary often fosters societal deference to the sta
tus of physicians. 101 In the lower court Sidaway opinion, for example,
the Master of the Rolls commented on the conduct of the defendant
surgeon as follows: "Bearing in mind that the plaintiff was not a pri
vate patient, it is a great tribute to Mr. Falconer's compassion and
interest that he [inquired as to the state of her health at all]. ..."102
Under Professor Katz's model of shared decisionmaking, at least a
modicum of compassion and interest would be mandatory attributes of
physician-patient interaction.
More troubling, particularly in the context of informed consent,
was Lord Denning's famous summing up to the jury in Hatcher v.
Black,103 thirty-odd years ago. That case concerned a BBC broad
caster who was no longer able to speak properly after a thyroid opera
tion. The plaintiff-patient specifically had asked her doctors whether
there was any possibility of vocal cord damage inherent in the surgery,
and had been reassured that there was not. 104 Lord Denning told the
jury: "In short, ... [the doctor] told a lie, but he did it because he
thought in the circumstances it was justifiable. If this were a court of
morals, this would raise a nice question ... [but] the law leaves this
question of morals to the conscience of the doctor."105 Hatcher was
overruled by Sidaway, but judicial deference to physicians persists in
100. See particularly Lord Diplock's opinion in Sidaway, discussed in supra text ac
companying notes 52-55.
IO\. For an account of the tortuous intellectual and social pathway to the English
bench, see Megarry, Barristers and Judges in England Today, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 387
(1982).
102. Sidaway v. Board of Govemors of Bethlem Royal Hosp., [1984] 2 W.L.R. 778,
782 (C.A.).
103. The Times (London), July 2, 1954, at 6, col. \. Lord Denning's summing up is
reprinted in A. T. DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF THE LAW, 242-49 (1979). Hatcher v.
Black was decided before the right to jury trial in personal injury cases was abolished. See
supra note 16.
104. Hatcher, The Times (London), July 2, 1954, at 6, col. \.
lOS. A. T. DENNING, supra note 104, at 243.
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more subtle form through the professional standard of disclosure. 106

III.

"THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT"
AND ENGLISH LAW

What are we to make of the varying shades of English judicial
opinion on the subject of informed consent in light of the special cir
cumstances surrounding health care delivery in England? More to the
point, how do they correspond with the model of shared decisionmak
ing proposed by The Silent World ofDoctor and Patient? One thing is
quite clear. The English medical profession initially controls the phy
sician-patient interaction to limit the amount of information which
must be conveyed to patients, a situation at odds with Professor Katz's
ideal. If patients assert themselves to ask questions, however, the bal
ance of power shifts. Doctors must then respond fully and truthfully
to their patients' concerns.
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient makes an eloquent plea
for just such dialogue between physicians and their charges, so that
decisions about medical care can be produced through an openly
shared process of evaluation. Professor Katz points out that idiosyn
cratic patient values often are ignored when physicians dominate the
decisionmaking process, but he also warns that medical issues can eas
ily be misunderstood when patients insist on total control. He knows
the sacrifices required on both sides for a true dialogue to take place
physicians must expose their uncertainty and patients must be willing
to bear the emotional burdens of that same doubt-and he does not
underestimate the time and effort required for open communication.
Nonetheless, Professor Katz convinces this reader that the results
are worthwhile for both sides. Physicians are released from the strain
of having to appear omnipotent when they know only too well that
they are not, and patients usually gain emotional strength when they
are able to exert a greater degree of mastery over decisions that deeply
affect their lives. These benefits should apply on both sides of the At
lantic. Moreover, the potential for medical malpractice litigation is
reduced by a sharing of information, because when patients are aware
of potential consequences before embarking on courses of treatment,
they are less likely to complain when something goes wrong or a
hoped-for result does not materialize. That point holds true for both
English and American patients, notwithstanding the "American dis
106. See. e.g., supra text accompanying note 51.
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ease." \07 More open communication might also increase political
pressure for more generous and efficient resource allocation within the
NHS.
English law, however, seems not to appreciate the full logic of
Professor Katz's analysis. Nor, for the most part, does the English
medical profession. Both doctors and judges often seem to believe that
English patients do not want to know the truth, and that it would hurt
them if they did. The sense of paternalism pervading many public
pronouncements from both the medical profession and the judiciary
reflects a different attitude toward the structuring of society and to
ward the responsibilities of its members to one another than is usually
articulated publicly in this country. It also dovetails neatly with the
reality of less abundant medical resources in the English welfare state.
At some level, doctors and judges may think it makes little sense for
patients to know all about alternative forms of treatment when as a
practical matter some of them simply may be unavailable.
Even though some of the Sidaway opinions contain dicta to the
effect that judges retain the right to second-guess whether doctors
have disclosed enough information, the thrust of the case undercuts
the primacy of patient choice-respect for individual autonomy, dig
nity, and integrity-that constitutes the heart of Professor Katz's anal
ysis. English law, in common with that of many American
jurisdictions, makes no representation that patients will enjoy a pro
cess of informed reflection as they make medical choices. Indeed, by
adopting a physician-oriented standard of disclosure English law pro
ceeds from the assumption that doctor knows best.
Even though in the wake of Sidaway the English medical profes
sion initially controls the information flow to patients, Professor
Katz's ideal of shared decisionmaking could easily gain momentum. \08
According to Sidaway, patients can shed their dun-brown dependent
status merely by asserting their prerogative to ask questions. Once
they have done that, they acquire the bright plumage of that rara avis,
the prudent patient. From then on, Sidaway teaches that they must be
told everything that would be material and relevant to the man on the
107. See Note, The Patient on the Clapham Omnibus, 47 MOD. L. REV. 454, 466-67
(1984).
108. Research on the impact of the Canadian Supreme Court's adoption of the pru
dent patient standard of disclosure in Reibl v. Hughes, 114 D.L.R. 3d 1 (1980), however, is
not encouraging with respect to changing physician behavior. See Robertson, Informed
Consent in Canada: An Empirical Study, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 139 (1984). For a U.S.
study suggesting that judicial decisions may produce only marginal changes in health pro
vider behavior, see Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An
Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 345 (1981).
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Clapham omnibus who is accustomed to taking responsibility for his
own decisions. And the mere process of communicating is likely to
increase the amount of information that doctors volunteer thereafter.
Perhaps as this becomes better understood by patients and doctors it
will seem less threatening to both. By communicating more openly
they may even find that they agree on the direction the bus should
take. Although the route might be circuitous, Professor Katz would
at least approve of the result.

